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Abstract: In contrast to the neo-liberal ideology which dominates much of 
modern economic discourse, virtue ethics embraces the same set of morality 
for both private and public sphere. In this paper we argue that virtue ethics 
need nevertheless not at all be in clash with contemporary economic theory. 
Linking the preferences represented by utility functions in neoclassical 
economics and the system of values which inspires them can in our view 
align economic thinking with broader social thinking. Using this novel 
approach, we demonstrate that many economic and social problems can be 
solved so as to arrive at efficient outcomes and a higher expected level of 
utility compared to a case with separate public and private moralities. For 
addressing the problems characteristic of small open economies, our virtue-
ethics perspective on economics supports some government intervention as 
well as cooperation and solidarity between societies in a similar situation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A defining characteristic of neo-liberal political ideology is a sharp divide between 
private and public morality (e.g. Gray, 1995). This divide is the dominant 
determinant of the concept of human flourishing in neoliberalism. In this work we 
argue that such a divide is deeply controversial from the point of view of virtue 
ethics which we promote in this text. For instance, what a public official does in his 
private life is also important for his job, not in the least because of the example that 
he sets to his fellow citizens. We demonstrate that instead many phenomena 
important for human flourishing cross the border between private and public. From 
the point of view of virtue-ethics, such phenomena are therefore also subject to 
                                                 
∗ EBS Business School, EBS University, Germany, mrdjan.mladjan@ebs.edu  
• Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, Serbia, 
fatic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs 
Economics and morality – how to reconcile economic thinking 
200 
moral regulation. For this reason, the virtue-ethics perspective on economics which 
we develop in this paper also crosses the border between public and private. 
Moreover, we argue that our virtue-ethics perspective on economics need not at all 
be in clash with the contemporary economic theory. In contrast, we show that it is 
possible to join the lens of virtues-ethics with the toolkit of neoclassical economics, 
the dominant set of economic theories studied at the world’s leading universities. 
Using our innovative method, we argue that a multitude of contemporary problems 
of the economy and the society can be seen as failures of the markets to themselves 
lead to efficient outcomes. In particular, we emphasize that efficiency of any 
allocation of goods or of output is a category which can be evaluated only subject 
to certain set of preferences, while the choice of the set of preferences is 
determined by a desired system of values. It is exactly this link between the 
preferences represented by utility functions in neoclassical economics and the 
system of values which inspires them can in our view align economic thinking with 
broader social thinking. Note further that opting for a certain system of values will 
simultaneously determine which outcomes can be considered market failures. Once 
identified, these failures could then be addressed using the standard policy 
prescriptions of neoclassical economics that involve some form of government 
intervention. 
We would like to emphasize that various systems of values, and not only that 
inspired by virtue-ethics, could in principle be used to determine the preferences 
represented by a certain utility function. But, we argue that values inspired by 
virtue-ethics could lead to superior outcomes in terms of social wellbeing 
compared to values inspired by liberal ethics. This is because using the same set of 
morality for both private and public sphere, a distinguishing characteristic of 
virtue-ethics compared to liberal ethics, allows the elite to serve as the role model 
for the society. Moreover, it allows the elite to raise the society’s happiness by 
creating cohesive value communities around a carefully chosen set of values. 
We finally argue that reconciling economic thinking with broader social thinking is 
important for the social wellbeing and the sustainability of economic growth, 
particularly in small open economies. From among a number of reasons for this, 
we emphasize two. Firstly, small markets are more likely to experience market 
failures as a consequence of market power of a few mighty firms. While this is a 
typical market failure, the ideological bias of the elite of a recently opened 
economy would have a tendency to overlook it or even justify it. Secondly, the 
sudden change to an open economy, undoubtedly beneficial in many respects, 
could also endanger the positive aspects of national business culture and culture in 
general. In such an environment, our virtue-ethics perspective on economics can 
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support some government intervention with the aim of correcting market failures 
and so preserving the economic wellbeing, national culture, and sovereignty; it can 
also support cooperation and solidarity between societies in a similar situation. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The following subchapter 
introduces the concept of virtue ethics and compares the main implications of 
virtue ethics with those of liberal ethics when analyzing the problems of the 
contemporary society and economy. The third subchapter explains the importance 
of the concept of efficiency for social wellbeing and its dependence on the chosen 
system of values. The fourth subchapter argues that opting for a system of values 
inspired by virtue ethics can lead to higher social wellbeing than choosing an 
ethical system which stands for a distinction between public and private moralities. 
The fifth subchapter illustrates how aligning economic thinking and broader social 
thinking can be particularly beneficial for small open economies. The final chapter 
concludes. 
2. THE CONCEPT OF VIRTUE ETHICS AND ITS VALUE COMPARED 
TO THAT OF OTHER CONTEMPORARY SYSTEMS OF ETHICS  
Virtue ethics differs from the other methods of thinking about ethical issues in that 
it posits certain substantive values as guiding criteria by which to make moral 
evaluations, and embeds those values in a particular vision of desirable moral 
character of a person. Thus virtue ethics is able to avoid many of the pitfalls of 
more formal and impersonal views of ethics, such as pure deontic ethics, 
consequentialist ethics, or developmental ethics. For example, deontic (or 
deontological) ethics insists that the moral value of actions (or choices) is 
determined by the consistency of those choices with certain universal moral 
principles, regardless of the practical value of the choices in real life (e.g. always 
act so that you may wish that under similar conditions everybody else would 
choose the same course of action). This means that one is justified in making moral 
choices in accordance with one's conscience, and this entails that one would 
consistently be able to desire for everybody else to think in the same way and act 
similarly in similar situations. However, the problem with deontic ethics is that in 
reality people tend to value universal moral principles differently. Thus, for 
example, if my universal moral principle is to always protect the vulnerable, no 
matter what the cost, I would naturally be able to desire that everybody else makes 
their relevant choices based on the same principle; however, by acting consistently 
with this principle, I am likely to offend the moral sense of those whose primary, 
universal moral principle is that of everybody's right to their own property, 
because, if, for instance, I am a public official, protecting the most vulnerable will 
likely mean arranging a redistribution of income in society which will favor those 
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who would otherwise fall through the social system and be helpless. This is only 
possible at the cost of those who have done well in the same system, and my desire 
that everybody acts as a socialist might cause substantial rifts, even social or 
political instability, if it collides with sufficiently many others who hold different 
principles particularly dear. In acting against the interests of those who wish to 
hold on to their rightfully gained wealth, I act perfectly clearly deontologically: my 
adherence to the deontic principle of always assisting the most vulnerable is 
sincere, and if I were wealthy, I would genuinely desire to be taxed additionally, 
however this does not necessarily solve the problem of the practical consequences 
of my choices for society. 
The opposite moral methodology is the so-called “consequentialist ethics”, which 
postulates that a moral action is justified if and only if in the sum of its foreseeable 
consequences it increases the well-being (or rights, or satisfaction of interests, or 
however else general satisfaction might be defined) of most stakeholders in the 
decision. In the above example, this would mean that in making a decision on the 
level of taxation and the consequent redistribution of wealth, I must consider how 
many people would benefit from my decisions and to what extent, and then choose 
that course of action which enhances the well-offness of most. This may mean 
acting in the same way as the benevolent deontologist above, if there are so many 
of those who are vulnerable who would be helped substantially at the relatively 
moderate cost to the few of those who are well off, but it also may mean letting the 
vulnerable fail utterly and reduce taxation for the wealthiest. The outcome is the 
result of a calculation, not of adhering to a universal moral principle. 
Virtue ethics is capable of avoiding both of these pitfalls of deontology and 
consequentialism, because it assumes that in a particular community there are 
certain character traits in people which are generally desirable, and individuals with 
these traits should be trusted to make the most prudent and morally acceptable 
decisions. Virtue ethics thus posits standards which an exemplary moral 
personality should fulfil, and the actions are judged largely based on what such an 
exemplary person might have chosen to do. Traces of virtue-ethics-based thinking 
are present in the manner in which many legal norms are defined in the English 
law. These formulations involve characterizations such as “what a reasonable 
person might expect in the given circumstances”, “what a prudent person would be 
expected to choose”, etc. In adjudicating individuals’ actions, the courts thus 
deliberate, among other criteria, whether and to what extent the choices of the 
person were what an essentially upstanding individual in society might chose to do 
or not. The described way of thinking about the law allows the courts to moralize: 
they make their decisions not only based on the letter of the law, but also on moral 
evaluations which they explicitly or implicitly ascribe to particular individuals. 
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This type of practice is essential for the maintenance of standards of social decency 
and an accepted vision of virtue; contrariwise, the practice of many European 
continental courts, which tend to be guided literally by the law, and even explicitly 
distance themselves from any kind of “moral, as opposed to strictly legal” 
reasoning, is potentially deeply destructive for public morality. The law by itself, 
ideally, should stem from basic moral intuitions and the ideal of virtue in a 
community; however there is no guarantee that the positive law will necessarily 
reflect public morality, and in such cases an interpretative, creative role of the 
courts is absolutely essential to preserve the higher standard (morality) from being 
actually undermined by the lower standard (the law itself). Judging the personality, 
in aspects both directly relevant and not directly relevant to the issue that is being 
adjudicated is fundamental here. For example, there is reason to believe that an 
exemplary community member who embodies many of the community’s virtues 
ought to be treated considerably more leniently for a legal transgression than 
someone who is known to show disregard for public morality. This is a 
controversial issue, and one that one of us has recently addressed at more length 
(Fatiü, 2016: 201–226). 
This very aspect of virtue ethics brings us close to the mentioned discussion of the 
public and private. The liberal ideology and its neoliberal incarnation insist that the 
preservation of individual liberty is predicated upon a strong separation of the 
private from the public, or of private life from public life. This is thought to 
prevent the “infringement” of the state and society upon matters deemed entirely 
within the sovereignty of a free individual in a democratic society. Such a view is 
essentially incompatible with virtue ethics, simply because virtue cannot 
necessarily be separated into private and public virtues. A person is judged to be 
upstanding based on one’s life and one’s choices, both private and public. Thus, 
someone who might act impeccably as a public servant, but regularly cheats on 
one’s spouse, drinks and is seen in disreputable company would hardly be 
considered a virtuous individual by most accepted social standards. Yet, in a 
neoliberal context, it would be morally unacceptable to factor the person’s personal 
immorality into their evaluation as a public servant. To take an extreme example, 
as long as one sticks to the neoliberal concept of privacy, this would mean that a 
police officer who is neither corrupt, nor deviant during office hours, but is known 
to commit adultery, gamble, use legal drugs and associate with the town’s ruffians, 
would not be able to be considered less morally fit for the job than another police 
officer who acts the same at work, but has none of the enumerated problematic 
habits in her private life. Such a conclusion, while “liberally” correct, would 
certainly be counterintuitive. Virtue ethics does not recognize a sharp divide 
between the private and the public, although it is capable of acknowledging various 
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degrees of relevance of private life in the judgment of a person in their public 
capacity. 
One particular type of virtue ethics which is especially relevant to our argument 
here is sentimentalist ethics (Slote, 2010). Its distinguishing feature from the other 
virtue ethics is that it insists on the possession of a particular quality in virtuous 
individuals, namely the propensity for and high regard for empathy. Sentimentalist 
ethics is thus an ethics which sees empathetic persons (and, by extension, 
empathetic public policy) as virtuous in itself. This, then, gives rise to an array of 
other virtues that are called for, namely loyalty, solidarity, trust, dependability, etc. 
Sentimentalist ethics has special repercussions for the idea of an efficient economic 
system which would also be just, because it presents a contrasted alternative to the 
neo-liberal thinking. While the main idea of neoliberalism is that the best way to 
contribute to human wellbeing is to promote free entrepreneurship (perhaps the 
most accurate definition of neoliberalism, which is often used as a fuzzy and 
mainly negative characterization) (Harvey, 2005: 2), sentimentalism is close to the 
concept of care ethics, where the duty of care is seen as paramount to the work of 
public institutions and the state as a whole. This duty, then, extends to the 
economic system, as well. Care ethics requires the system, whether it is the 
economy, the military, or the social service, to actually care for the wellbeing of 
the citizens not in terms of their relative positions vis-a-vis one another (e.g. as in 
ensuring “fair competition”), but factually, how satisfied and stable they are in their 
lives in all aspects that depend on a particular system. This would mean that the 
moral justification of an economic system depends on whether the main economic 
institutions can actually demonstrate that the decisions they have taken have arisen 
from genuinely caring and trying to assist those in need in society, as well as from 
trying to keep those who are well-off from failing significantly. Such arguments 
would have to go considerably beyond statistics and academic discussions about 
particular ideologies, and would likely involve examples and references to specific 
substantive values which the economic institutions have sought to uphold. 
Developing such an economic ethics which would be based on care ethics as a 
variant of moral sentimentalism is our work in progress. 
One promising avenue of pursuing a theory of economic ethics would be based on 
the role trust plays in maximizing the efficiency of economic and, indeed, of most 
transactions in society overall, and how virtues are inculcated in the possibility of 
trust. On the one hand, trust arises either from institutional assurances (in which 
case a certain “virtuousness” or “trustworthiness” of institutions is presupposed), or 
from a moralistic belief that people ought to be trusted until they prove otherwise. 
Eric Uslaner labels the first type of trust “strategic trust” and the second type 
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“moralistic trust” (Uslaner, 2002: 14–50). Once accumulated, trust in society leads 
to the development of a number of other virtues, such as civility (Seligman, 2010: 
62–74) and facilitates what Seligman calls “generalized exchange”, namely 
transactions in society on all levels and at a far more efficient rate. Trust is thus a 
prime form of social capital (Seligman, 2010: 75–100). 
Finally, it may be useful to point it out here that sentimentalist ethics shows 
methodological advantages over other methodologies of ethical thinking, in that it 
is capable of reconciling and uniting both deontological and consequentialist 
ethics. Empathy, or, by our lights, care, is a deontological principle: recall that in 
sentimentalism actions are judged as morally justified or unjustified depending on 
their conformity with the duty of empathy or care. At the same time, 
sentimentalism is a consequentialist method of ethical thinking, because it seeks to 
achieve a state of affairs in which the overall amount of empathy, solidarity, trust 
etc. is maximized. Finally, of course, sentimentalism is a virtue ethics, because it 
posits an empathetic or caring character as socially exemplary. This allows 
sentimentalist virtue ethics to serve an inclusive role which makes it particularly 
suitable for developing an economic ethics and dealing with the concept of 
efficiency. 
3. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND SYSTEM OF VALUES 
Neoclassical economics represents the body of economic theory which the leading 
centers for education and research in economics around the world uphold as the 
contemporary standard.1 Central to it is the idea of a perfectly competitive 
economy in equilibrium (Pearce, 1999: 301). Importantly, the competitive 
equilibrium of an economy is characterized by economic efficiency: in exchange 
(Pareto efficiency), markets for production inputs (technical efficiency), as well as 
output markets (output efficiency) (Pindyck, Rubinfeld, 2001: 574, 590-91).2
Efficiency is important because a lack of it means that, by rearranging the available 
resources, it would be possible to increase at least someone’s wellbeing without 
decreasing the wellbeing of anyone else. For this reason, inefficient outcomes are 
necessarily suboptimal for a society that cares, at least to some extent, for each of 
its individuals. 
                                                 
1 In the subfield of macroeconomics, neoclassical economics is complemented by 
neoclassical synthesis (Pearce, 1999: 302). 
2 That competitive equilibria are economically efficient is stated by the first fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics. 
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The goal of an economic system ought to be however not only efficiency but also 
justice. While an inefficient outcome appears necessarily unjust – since correcting 
the inefficiency would make at least someone better off without hurting anyone – 
an efficient outcome need not be just. For instance, if one person is in possession of 
all the goods in an economy, while the others of none, this may also be efficient; in 
case the rich person feels no compassion for others and she is not willing to 
voluntarily share some of her goods with them, the only way to make others better 
off would be to make her worse off. Striving towards justice, societies therefore 
frequently engage in some form of redistribution of income, goods, or property, 
where the optimal form and the extent of redistribution depends on the system of 
values held by the society, or at least its decision-making elite. Nevertheless, if 
redistribution were to disturb an efficient outcome and lead to an inefficient one, 
one problem would simply be substituted by another. Luckily, in competitive 
markets, trades following any redistribution would lead to an outcome which 
would also be efficient and could be more just than the original one.3
For an efficient outcome to be achieved, both prior to and following redistribution, 
we therefore depend on markets being competitive. But the requirements for 
competition do not always hold. In these cases we face market failures which are 
traditionally considered to take the forms of market power, externalities, public 
goods, and incomplete information (Pindyck, Rubinfeld, 2001: 591-92). Luckily, 
economic theory has already devised remedies, which typically involve some form 
of government intervention, for each of these types of market failures. When 
applied, these remedies could move markets back to competitiveness and lead to 
efficient outcomes. While a system of values stands in the focus of discussions on 
the desired form of redistribution, we argue that it should also be taken into 
account when answering whether outcomes are efficient and whether markets are 
competitive. This is because both allocative and output efficiency can only be 
evaluated subject to a utility function which represents a certain set of preferences 
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green, 1995: 175), the latter being inspired by a system of 
values. We therefore argue that economic thinking and broader social thinking 
could indeed be reconciled by making the preferences represented by utility 
functions in economics consistent with a chosen system of values. 
                                                 
3 That every efficient allocation is a competitive equilibrium for some initial allocation of 
goods, as long as individual preferences are convex, is stated by the second fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics. In practice, however, any state-administered redistribution 
involves institutions which are costly, and the need to pay taxes may lead individuals and 
firms to work and produce less. Thus, at least some loss of efficiency, and its tradeoff with 
the compensating gain in equity, appears hard to avoid. 
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To illustrate how the system of values can determine whether a market can be 
considered competitive and the outcomes to which it leads efficient we will use, 
similar to Mladjan, Markoviü (2016), an example of trade between two countries. 
Suppose that both of these countries start by producing both food and jewelry. If 
their citizens are allowed to freely trade, each would specialize in the production of 
that good for which it has a comparative advantage4. After specializing, only 
jewelry would be produced in one of the countries and only food in the other. By 
opening to trade, citizens of both countries would be able to consume more than in 
autarchy, so specialization could be considered both an improvement in wellbeing 
and an efficient outcome. But, how could our conclusion change if we were to 
allow for the possibility that the two countries go to a long-lasting war? If this were 
to happen, the one producing jewelry would have to surrender so as to avoid 
hunger. Suppose now that occupation by the other country would not endanger the 
income of the occupied population, which would still be allowed to produce 
jewelry and trade it for food, but that sovereignty and many elements of national 
culture would be lost.  
In order to answer the question whether the market was competitive and whether 
the outcome of specialization was efficient, we would need to form an expectation 
on the likelihood of war and know to what extent the citizens of the country that 
would specialize in producing jewelry care about sovereignty and national culture. 
In case that their system of values is such that they are concerned solely with their 
income, specialization was an efficient outcome. If they however do care for their 
independence and national identity, specialization was not efficient. The 
individuals instead traded without being fully aware of the consequences that their 
decision to buy food from abroad could have for their country and the lives of their 
loved ones in the long run. This could be regarded as a market failure due to 
incomplete information, for those unaware of the consequences of their trades. 
Moreover, it could be seen as a negative externality imposed by those that were 
aware of the consequences of their trades but did not take into account the pain that 
loss of sovereignty and national culture would impose on their countrymates that, 
unlike themselves, care for these values. Importantly, when we opt for a system of 
values and use it to identify a market failure, we can resort to remedies already 
prepared by neoclassical economic theory for correcting that type of market failure. 
                                                 
4 “Country 1 has a comparative advantage over Country 2 in producing a good if the cost of 
producing that good, relative to the cost of producing other goods in 1, is lower than the 
cost of producing the good in 2, relative to the cost of producing other goods in 2” 
(Pindyck, Rubinfeld, 2001: 585). Notice that, using comparative advantage, opportunities to 
trade are more likely to be found than if a country were to export only goods for which it 
has an absolute advantage, which would mean that it has a lower cost of producing them 
than the other country. 
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In this case, government intervention in the form of tariffs or quotas on imports, or 
direct government production, could insure that enough food is produced 
domestically even after partial specialization in the production of jewelry. 
It appears that the preferences that are used to judge on the efficiency of a certain 
outcome could be inspired by various systems of values. In this work, we chose to 
rely on a system of values that stems from virtue ethics. Notice that, after 
appropriately choosing a set of preferences in the aforementioned example, the 
distinction between what could be considered decisions that concern only the 
individual, and those that concern the whole society (alternatively the division 
between private and public morality), is reduced or even fully removed, just as it is 
in virtue ethics. 
4. UNITING VIRTUE ETHICS AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS: 
FEASIBILITY AND ADVANTAGES FOR INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL 
WELLBEING 
Could virtue ethics in principle be reconciled with neoclassical economics? For this 
to be the case, the system of morality associated to virtue ethics needs to be 
compatible with the utility functions which are used in neoclassical economics. At 
first sight, there seems to be a fundamental obstacle to achieve this: 
consequentialist moralities appear to be those that could intuitively be built into 
preferences which are used in utility functions while important elements of virtue 
ethics are deontic in nature (Slote, 2010: 13–27). Consequentialist moralities justify 
actions based on the consequences they produce. For any set of actions a set of 
preferences could thus be used to order these actions based on how preferable their 
consequences are expected to be. A utility function representing these preferences 
could then assign a value to each action. The utility is thus calculated from the 
expected consequence, while the actions, circumstances, and even accidents which 
led to it may not matter for the value of utility themselves. In contrast to this, 
deontic morality arises from certain substantive principles concerning what the 
agent does. For instance, deontic criteria may demand that the truth is always told, 
property rights are always protected, that one is always loyal to his company, 
friends, or family, and alike. Importantly, the recommendation for an action may be 
given regardless of the consequences it is expected to produce.  
Is it then possible to have a utility function that represents a set of preferences that 
satisfy deontic criteria? We would argue that this could be achieved by assigning a 
certain value of utility to each action, not based on the consequences it could be 
expected to produce, but based on the extent to which the action itself satisfies 
deontic criteria which may apply to it. Even in cases in which morality is a 
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combination of consequentialist and deontic considerations, as in sentimentalist 
ethics, representing it using a utility function should not be troublesome: some 
actions may be judged based on their expected consequences, some based on 
deontic criteria, and some based on both, depending on which type of 
considerations is seen as more important in each case. That both consequentialist 
and deontic criteria for morality can be inculcated into preferences represented by a 
utility function should however not come as a surprise given that deontic criteria, 
such as virtue, could also be the goal of consequentialism. 
Having argued that preferences based on deontic moral principles, important for 
virtue ethics, could be represented using utility functions, we also consider to what 
extent other characteristics of morality important for virtue ethics are in line with 
neoclassical economics. Another important characteristic of virtue ethics, and a 
difference from liberal ethics, is its treatment of public and private morality. 
Liberal ethics insists on a division between private and public morality, where the 
latter could, or even should, exclude deontic criteria. Virtue ethics instead rejects 
this division, and sees the members of the elite who hold public office as both 
managers of aggregate interests and those who provide a moral example and 
further values. In this virtue ethics moves beyond subjectivism in moral evaluations 
and requires some assumed consensus of what it means to be a respectable person 
in society in moral terms (Fishkin, 1984). We argue that the treatment of public and 
private morality in virtue ethics is not only compatible with neoclassical 
economics, but that virtue ethics, by using the same morality for both private and 
public sphere, could for several reasons lead to greater wellbeing, both for the 
society’s aggregate5 and for most individuals, than liberal ethics. In the rest of this 
subchapter, we identify six reasons for why the adherence to the same set of 
morality for both private and public sphere could lead to greater social wellbeing, 
as well as greater wellbeing of most individuals, compared to a case in which 
moralities are separate. 
The first two reasons why virtue ethics ought to lead to greater wellbeing compared 
to liberal ethics are associated to the reign of heteronomy in society. If one’s 
freedom and the experience of life in general are truly limited by the structures and 
rules of the society, as long as decisions of public officials are affected by their 
personal preferences, a unified morality will make decisions of state officials that 
affect daily lives of the citizens more similar to the preferences of the citizens 
(Nagel, 1979). The examples of such decisions could include priority lists for 
infrastructural investment, tax policy, social care policy, as well as the culture 
prevailing in state institutions which daily interact with citizens. The citizens would 
                                                 
5 As measured by a social welfare function that applies a weight to each individual’s utility 
in determining what is socially desirable (Pindyck, Rubinfeld, 2001: 576). 
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thus feel happy about the decisions of the state officials because they would be the 
same as those they would make themselves if asked to shape the structures of the 
state and the society that directly affect their daily lives.  
There are however other decisions of state officials that also matter for the citizens’ 
happiness. To the extent that other decisions which are in the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the state but do not affect most people’s daily lives, such as foreign or defense 
policy, are affected by the personal preferences of the public officials which make 
them, a unified morality will also lead to a lower difference between the choices of 
state officials and the preference of the citizens. The citizens could thus feel happy 
about the decisions of the state officials as they could relate to them as if they were 
their own. One could of course question the extent to which citizens would care 
about that type of decisions. But, everyday discussions between people in a 
restaurant, in a taxi, or at a hair dresser’s shop, testify that people do care for many 
such elements of national policy. This may be so because people associate their 
own prestige with that of their nation, or because their family’s memory testifies 
that even such elements of national policy can occasionally become very important 
for daily life, especially in periods of great political turbulence and conflict. 
Two further reasons result in greater social wellbeing, and that for most 
individuals, when public and private moralities are the same. A unified morality 
would namely enable the elite to serve as a role model for the rest of the society. 
Over time, this could lead to a convergence of values of individual citizens towards 
the values of the elite. Given that we just established that the decisions of the elite 
are perceived as important by the citizens and thus matter for their happiness, the 
sum of individuals’ utilities calculated by a social welfare function should rise as 
the average difference between personal preferences and the choice of public 
officials declines during the convergence process. While narrowing the gap 
between the preferences of the citizens and the elite ought to matter for social 
wellbeing, we argue that the set of values chosen by the elite for the target of this 
convergence would also matter. In other words, we believe that not all sets of 
values that could be chosen by the elite would lead to the same level of social 
wellbeing. To illustrate why this ought to be so, we proceed to use two opposing 
quotes that represent the sets of values propagated by parts of the Serbian6 elite in 
the beginning and at the end of the twentieth century. 
                                                 
6 Serbian in this context refers to the elite of the Serbian people, irrespective of the region 
or country that it inhabits. We consider its elite as unique, given that communication 
between the members of the elite that live in different political jurisdictions, and their 
influence on the people in other jurisdictions, was and to this day remains frequent. 
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During the last years of the twentieth century, the singers of popular music gained 
importance in the Serbian society as role models, not in the least because the mass 
media allowed them to gain enough popularity to earn sufficiently well so as to be 
relatively rich compared to large parts of their impoverished society in economic 
transition. One could qualify the type of lifestyle their songs promoted as that of 
immediate satisfaction rather than perseverance in work for the achievement of 
longer term goals. One of the best examples is contained in the words of one of the 
songs of the singer Violeta Viki Miljkoviü (1974–) (Miljkoviü, 1994): 
“Some people like this, other people like that, 
And me and you, young one, [we] always [like] something new. 
Some people like books, going for a walk, and loneliness, 
While the two of us, my boy, we live during the night. 
Coca cola, marlboro, suzuki, discothèques, guitars, bouzouki7.  
This is [real] life, not an advertisement. Nobody is happier than us.” 
Interestingly, the verses of this song explicitly refer to happiness, or wellbeing, and 
that not only of the singer herself but everyone else who embraces that type of 
lifestyle, in this case her and her boyfriend. They thus make a direct connection 
between a lifestyle that stems from a certain system of values and happiness, and 
actually compare two sets of preferences by their expected utility outcome. The 
writer of the verses of Miljkoviü’s song would thus appear to agree with the 
authors of this paper on that the level of wellbeing should depend on the set of 
values. An opposing lifestyle and system of values is illustrated by the following 
quote from the testament of Isidor Dobroviü (1841-1914), a Serbian trader from 
Baranya region, one of the largest benefactors of Privrednik, a society dedicated to 
the free education of poor Serbian children from all over Austria-Hungary for 
crafts or trade. In his will Dobroviü advises: 
“We, the older ones, must help, create foundations, and you, the youth, 
(should) work, work and make savings, pray to God, seek advice from the 
more experienced adults, and love your work – the rest shall come by itself 
(Krestiü, 1998)”. 
The two world views appear confronted: the first one seems to favor unrestrained 
experimentation over consulting the adults, night life over day life, and amusement 
over work. Without looking upon the human drive towards immediate satisfaction 
celebrated in Miljkoviü’s song, we believe that it could be justified only as an 
occasional rest aimed at sweetening the effort and occasional bitterness of life, 
                                                 
7 Bouzouki is a type of Greek musical instrument originating from Asia Minor. 
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rather than a set a values and goals that should themselves represent the purpose of 
life. On the other hand, we believe that a longer term happiness of an individual 
and success of a society can rather be assured by the set of values proposed by 
Dobroviü in his will. Moreover, we interpret the Serbian social and economic 
history following the dates of the two quotes as speaking in favor of our view. We 
thus conclude that the level of utility of each citizen, and therefore the social 
wellbeing, could depend not only on the difference between his preferred choice 
and the choice made by public officials, but also on the type of values that inspired 
the elite’s preferred choice. A unified morality would allow the elite not only to 
unite the citizens around a single set of values, but also to make this set of values 
the best possible – that which maximizes the social wellbeing. 
Finally, we can identify at least two reasons for why the outcomes associated to a 
common morality between public and private sphere ought to lead to outcomes that 
are both more humane and improve efficiency; as such, they also result in greater 
social wellbeing and that of most individuals. Firstly, the creation of cohesive value 
communities reduces the need for and cost of state intervention – reducing the need 
for taxation which is associated to inefficiency – since social stigma can play the 
role that costly legal sanctions play in a liberal society. Note that both a social 
stigma and its corrective effect on an individual’s behavior are possible only in a 
cohesive value community. This is because only members of a community that 
share a certain set of values will have the expectation that other members of the 
same community would adhere to them. Finding legitimacy in these values, 
encouraged by the fact they are not alone, they would openly express their opinion 
on the extent to which an individual’s actions agree with these values, disregarding 
the liberal objection that this would be interference with an individual’s freedom. 
Moreover, only if an individual belongs to that community and accepts that he 
should in principle act in accordance with its values, perhaps because for many 
needs in his life he is directed towards and dependent on that community, will he 
feel ashamed if the other members see that his actions defy the shared values. If the 
members of the community are mean towards the member that rejects its values 
one could argue that such a cohesive value community may in fact be reducing 
instead of raising the wellbeing of its members. But, if the corrective pressure is 
connected with expressions of sincere worry for and love towards community 
members that in their view err, such a social stigma may be a more humane and 
more effective way to correct socially problematic types of behavior that in a 
liberal society would have to be dealt, frequently in a more advanced stage, with 
some form of, always costly, state intervention. 
Another reason for why a common morality between public and private sphere may 
lead to more humane outcomes that also increase efficiency can be related to acts 
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of solidarity and mutual help. We expect that privately-initiated manifestations of 
solidarity are more likely to occur in cohesive value communities and that such 
deeds should usually lead to higher wellbeing than state-administered redistribution 
of goods, property, or income. The origin of most acts of solidarity must be 
empathy, and one is more likely to feel it towards a person one knows, which 
should more frequently happen in any type of community than in a society of self-
centered individuals. One can feel more empathy when one understands the other 
person better, and one is able to identify with that person and her difficulty. This is 
more likely to happen in a community that shares the same values, because these 
values in part determine the ambitions and circumstances of life of each individual, 
and one can more easily identify with people who think alike and who are in 
similar circumstances. 
Manifestations of solidarity within cohesive value communities are not only more 
likely to occur but should also lead to higher wellbeing than state-administered 
redistribution. The first reason has to do with how the redistribution of income is 
perceived by both the giving and the receiving side. If the redistributive 
mechanisms of a welfare state are perceived as the results of a social consensus, as 
in Western European social market economies after WWII, rather than an 
expression of solidarity, the taxed ones are deprived of the joy of giving while the 
beneficiaries do not experience thankfulness for receiving what they instead 
consider their right, an argument going back to at least to the Serbian bishop 
Nikolaj Velimiroviü (Velimiroviü, 2001). This reduces the immaterial wellbeing of 
both groups. One way to address this concern would be to keep the redistributive 
mechanisms of the welfare state, but change the perception of the nature of the 
transfer by both the giving and the receiving side. As long as the transfer is made 
compulsory however, there is a danger that the perception would drift back away 
from a positive mutual predisposition of the different social groups towards an 
emotionally cold social compromise. If, however, the redistributive mechanisms of 
a welfare state are at least in part substituted, or complemented8, by voluntary 
transfers inspired by solidarity, the joy of giving and the thankfulness for receiving 
could instead raise the immaterial wellbeing.   
Acts of solidarity within cohesive communities could also raise the level of 
efficiency in how the resources are used to provide aid. This is because cohesive 
                                                 
8 To the extent that the compulsory redistributive mechanisms are kept, it may be beneficial 
to substitute the right to aid and the obligation to pay tax, with only the obligation to pay 
tax in order to help others, and the obligation of the state to help those in need, so as to at 
least incite the feeling of thankfulness among those that receive aid. In such an 
arrangement, instead of referring to their right, they could instead refer to the obligation of 
the state to help. 
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communities may better know who needs aid and how much of it. This could allow 
that a greater aggregate improvement in welfare is achieved using fewer resources 
than in a case of a redistribution administered by the state, whose institutions may 
be more distant to the receivers of aid than fellow community members. Non-
monetary transfers that can reduce the losses during the transfer process can also be 
easier administered within a community. If, for instance, the aid is needed to 
replace a roof of a house that belongs to a family with children in which at least 
one of the adult household members drinks, a monetary transfer from the state may 
result in at least part of the money being instead spent on alcohol. If a public 
servant were in charge of managing the process of repair, including buying the 
construction material and paying the workers, both neglect in choosing the best 
mix of price and quality and corruption could instead lead to a part of the funds 
being wasted. But, the money which would be spent on repairing the roof by the 
neighbors of the less fortunate family would not be wasted on alcohol or 
corruption: they would know both the needs and the weaknesses of the family, 
would manage the construction process themselves, and would not waste their own 
money which they could instead use for themselves or to help even more of those 
in need.  
We would finally like to observe that not all cohesive value communities may have 
the same potential to lead to acts of solidarity that raise the social wellbeing. For 
expressions of solidarity within a community to have the most potential to help, it 
is beneficial that it unites people from different economic strata, allowing the 
economically better off to help the worse off. Thus, cohesive value communities 
which are not based on a common economic standing but for instance on religious 
or national values should have a greater potential to help, especially if the 
economically well off sub-group is sufficiently large. 
5. ECONOMIC THINKING AND BROADER SOCIAL THINKING IN 
SMALL OPEN ECONOMIES 
Thus far we argued that our proposed approach could be very successful in 
improving social wellbeing and that of most individuals. Building on this, we 
proceed to give reasons why the beneficial effects could be particularly large in 
small open economies, and even more so in those that recently experienced 
economic transition. In our view, the benefits to such countries from policies that 
reconcile economic thinking and broader social thinking would result in both 
immediate gains in wellbeing and – through more sustainable economic growth –
higher wellbeing in the long run. Among many potential sources of such benefits, 
we would like to describe a few. 
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Firstly, notice that small markets are more likely to experience market failure due 
to the concentration of power of a few large firms; following privatization in 
transitional economies, these firms would aim to maximize profit and thus raise 
their prices well above their marginal cost of production. While being an economy 
open to competition from abroad could reduce their market power, the openness 
itself may not solve the problem. If local knowledge is important for success in the 
market, if foreign companies are not sufficiently interested to enter the market 
because of its small size, or if the local product distribution network is also marked 
by high concentration of ownership, then fewer goods would be produced and 
consumed and that at higher prices than in a competitive market. This is a typical 
case of market failure, and no special approach towards integrating broader social 
thinking in economic decision making should in principle be needed to recommend 
a government intervention with the aim of breaking monopolies and cartels and 
regaining output efficiency. But, integrating broader social thinking may in reality 
be necessary to confront a strong ideological bias against government intervention 
or ownership – associated to a system of values which, poor in solidarity, considers 
any market outcome as more equitable – prevalent in transitional elites. Viewing 
instead all the different economic classes of the society as one community would 
instead result in different policy recommendations. In case a country is not strong 
enough to regulate the markets with high concentration of power, government 
ownership of at least one major market player in an industry, with a clear mandate 
to follow the price and quality policy with the aim of breaking the cartel rather than 
taking a part of its profits, could instead correct the market failure and improve 
social wellbeing and that of most individuals. 
Secondly, ignoring the broader social consequences of having an open economy 
can lead to situations that, depending on the system of values used, could be 
regarded as market failures. Such a market failure could arise irrespective of 
whether the changes that created it increased or decreased output or consumption, 
just as in our example on trade in food and jewelry. For example, typical of small 
economies that experienced a sudden opening are changes that could endanger the 
positive aspects of national business culture and, by spreading outside of the 
companies, culture in general. One way this could ensue is through adoption of 
aggressive marketing strategies from abroad: methods of customer acquisition that 
range from impolite insistence to outright lies; this could be regarded as a market 
failure due to a negative externality. A similar mechanism of uncareful adoption of 
knowledge from abroad could make bad translations from English, preserving a 
foreign syntax and resorting to newly invented Anglicism, spread a distorted 
national language from firms’ internal documents to media and everyday use. 
Preservation of national language and business culture in domestically owned 
enterprises, whether government or privately owned, could work to correct such a 
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market failure. Similarly, the insistence of all stakeholders, from local management 
to customers, that foreign companies adapt to national culture, could result in its 
enrichment by selected foreign elements rather than devastation and replacement. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In periods of economic prosperity relative to own past or to the neighboring 
countries, most people may be sufficiently satisfied with what they have so as not 
to be willing to risk it in a social conflict, even if they are hurt by some injustices. 
In such times, the elites could become careless about preserving the balance 
between economic and social development, the concern for themselves and their 
countrymates, or about protecting the environment. But, in spite of the fact that 
people have a tendency to believe that “this time is different” (Reinhart, Rogoff, 
2008) – that due to better experience and policy making skills the current round of 
prosperity will last forever – financial and economic crises always happen again. 
Unfortunately, the social strife which frequently accompanies them can have the 
potential to lead to even greater disasters, the interwar Europe being a telling 
example.
In this chapter, we argued that it is possible to reconcile economic thinking with 
broader social thinking by linking the preferences represented by utility functions 
in neoclassical economics with a desired system of values. We also discussed why 
relying on virtue ethics instead of liberal ethics to inspire economic policy may be 
a way to both make historical disasters less likely and to, also in normal times, 
improve the social wellbeing and that of most individuals. Using a number of 
examples, we showed that our approach has the potential to consider both 
economic and non-economic contributions to wellbeing simultaneously. In these 
examples, many corrections of the financial aspect of inefficiencies result from 
replacement of costly government intervention with social rules of cohesive value 
communities and private initiatives. But, we also showed that higher efficiency 
could also be associated with lower consumption or production, depending on the 
effects on non-material wellbeing, as well as on material wellbeing in the long run, 
that a certain allocation may have. Moreover, we argued that even apparently 
purely non-economic decisions, such as foreign policy of a country, can also be 
evaluated for their efficiency. For the gains to the non-financial aspect of 
wellbeing, the influence of the elites on values was found to be of great 
importance. Considering small open economies, our approach recommends 
cooperation and solidarity between societies in a similar situation: extending the 
market size could help to reduce market failures due to market power, while a 
common insistence on preserving elements of similar national cultures may force 
international companies to adapt rather than impose their business culture. Finally, 
